Odd Lots

Branko Milanovic on What Comes After Globalization

Brief

Branko Milanović framed the episode around his new book, which traces the post‑1974 arc of global economic orders and argues we are witnessing the birth of “national market liberalism”: a regime in which governments preserve domestic market liberalism (competition, lower domestic regulation) while systematically reversing the liberal international order — raising tariffs, restricting cross‑border flows and pursuing mercantilist industrial policy. Milanović told hosts Joe Wisenthal and Tracy Alloway that he intends this label to capture a peculiar hybrid: domestic neoliberal continuities combined with aggressive, state‑led international economic competition. He traces this shift through the distributional consequences captured by the “elephant chart,” noting that Asia’s middle‑class rise has materially improved billions of lives while simultaneously eroding the global position of many Western lower‑middle deciles.

The conversation moved between macro history and concrete policy: Milanović emphasized China’s dual status — officially upper‑middle‑income and close to the U.S. on key technologies, yet still home to substantial rural poverty — and used consumption‑to‑GDP comparisons (China ~40–45% vs. U.S. ~70%) to explain why Chinese domestic demand still lags. He documented the rise of a new co‑earned elite (homo ploutio) that combines high labor compensation with large capital incomes and transmits advantages across generations, reinforcing political and economic entrenchment. Milanović argued the retreat from globalization raises the specter of escalating geoeconomic competition and even conflict unless political crises (he singled out Ukraine and Middle East wars) are contained and global institutions renegotiated to give China and India clearer roles. For remedies, he prioritized sustained growth in Africa and India as the only reliable way to lower global inequality, while domestically endorsing stronger public education and a recurring “pedagogical” tax on extraordinary wealth to curb plutocratic political power. Hosts probed and pushed back — Joe questioned placing Trump in an anti‑elite category given pro‑business policies; Milanović differentiated between the political grievances that elected leaders harness and the orthodox economic policies those leaders often pursue — underscoring the complexity of the present transition away from late‑20th century globalization.

Why it matters

Branko Milanović (guest) defines the emerging era as “national market liberalism”: governments preserve domestic market-liberal policies while abandoning the international liberal rules (free trade, capital/labor mobility) in favor of mercantilist, nationally oriented economic policy.

Key details

  • Milanović says China is now an upper‑middle‑income country by World Bank classification and technologically close to the United States, yet still contains large pockets of extreme rural poverty; he cited consumption/GDP ratios to show structural differences — roughly 40–45% for China, ~70% for the U.S., and ~50% for India.
  • Using the ‘elephant chart’ framework, Milanović highlights a dual-level shock: the rise of Asia (especially China) boosted global middle classes while depressing the relative global rank of many Western lower‑middle deciles; he notes the U.S. top 10% is a large group (≈30 million people) and documents the rise of a new elite he dubs homo ploutio — people who are simultaneously in the top decile of labor income and capital income.
  • Milanović warns national market liberalism increases risks: higher domestic inequality, strengthened plutocratic elites, and greater chance of strategic/mercantilist competition that could escalate to great‑power conflict; his optimistic corrective requires de‑escalation (ceasefires in Ukraine/Middle East) and a renegotiation of international institutions with greater roles for China and India.
  • On policy, Milanović emphasizes that reducing global inequality hinges on growth in poor countries — especially accelerated development in Africa and India — while domestic distributional tools should focus on education and a targeted, regular tax on extraordinary wealth (a “pedagogical tax”) to signal that extreme riches do not confer political rule.
  • Hosts pushed back on political framing: Joe Wisenthal questioned Milanović’s grouping of Trump with anti‑elite figures given Trump’s pro‑business, tax‑cut policies; Milanović replied that Trump’s political rise drew on voters aggrieved by neoliberal globalization even if his governing policies remained orthodox and elite‑friendly.
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