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Javier Blas and host Jason Bordoff examined why a prolonged closure of the Strait of Hormuz and a 10–15 million barrels per day disruption in supply did not produce the catastrophic oil‑price and economic shock many feared. Blas emphasized three categories of explanation: one‑off conditions (a pre‑existing oversupplied market and very high inventories), political/market psychology (frequent presidential “jawboning” about deals that altered trading risk appetite), and structural shifts (China’s dramatic reduction of seaborne crude imports and early effects of the energy transition). As of their July 28 recording Blas estimated only ~3 million b/d were transiting the Strait versus ~20 million b/d pre‑war; crude prices nevertheless sat in the mid‑$80s, a result Blas called “remarkable.”
They tracked the distributional and secondary effects: refining markets are strained (Blas said about 10% of global refining capacity offline and refining margins near ~$70/barrel vs. a historical comfort level around $35), so pump prices and jet fuel remain elevated even if crude falls. China’s choices — importing far less crude (from ~10–12 million seaborne b/d pre‑war to ~5.5–6 million in June–July) and leaning on coal and coal‑to‑chemicals — absorbed much of the pressure, but Blas stressed Chinese data opacity makes causation uncertain. He warned that coal demand looks set for a 2026 record (China’s coal‑to‑chemicals industry consumes ~400 Mt/year) and that petrochemicals are ~10–12% of oil demand. On gas, the U.S. benefits from low Henry Hub (<$3/MMBtu) while Europe pays far higher TTF levels, and Blas expects renewed LNG project push outside the Gulf — risking longer‑term overcapacity and lower future LNG prices. Bordoff and Blas agreed markets have shown resilience but cautioned this could be luck: infrastructure investments (bypass pipelines, refineries, SPR refills) and who pays for insurance will shape whether future chokepoint shocks are as muted. Uncertainties highlighted include the replicability of China’s behavior, the time needed to restore damaged refining capacity (notably in Russia), and the tradeoffs of financing resilience versus investing in clean energy.
Javier Blas: Five months into the Middle East conflict the Strait of Hormuz was largely closed at times, disrupting an estimated 10–15 million barrels per day of oil supply; Blas still counts the market as not in full crisis despite that disruption because Brent/traded oil has stayed in the mid‑$80s.
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