Civilisation is about agreeing to ‘positive compromises’, which extend interdependence into kin networks, custom, or subsistence.
> I will not avenge a murder with extrajudicial punishment;
> I will allow the price of your goods or labour to vary upwards and you will allow mine;
> I will let you say something offensive to me, in exchange for you letting me to do the same;
> I will allow development in this case, which costs me, and you will allow it in another case, which hurts you;
> I will pay my tax (even if I could get away with not doing so) and you will;
> I will not exploit the benefit/welfare system and you won’t either.
This ‘coalition of yes’ has allowed us to expand to an ever greater of complexity and interdependence.
Developing countries tend to be unable to expropriate particular property owners and, for example, must build inefficient railway alignments to avoid using too much eminent domain. They can’t produce many public goods. Property rights will be exploited if they can be, and courts cannot be trusted to restore them, so people deal mainly with kin.
But, especially in the US and UK, we are heading down a dark path of negative compromises and the ‘coalition of no’.
The classic reason for a coalition of no, which we see across all developing countries across history, including, say, the UK in 1600, is graft. Corruption extracts the surplus generated by positive compromise, and more, breaking it down. To protect themselves from extraction, people hunker down.
Corruption creates negative compromise: each protects what they have. The default state of society is a kind of hardcore libertarianism, in which property rights, at least for most people, are secure, but only because of endless negative sum protective activity.
Western societies worked very hard to banish naked financial corruption. It took decades, but the norm was established & backed up by rules and laws to keep it going.
However, a new kind of corruption emerged. Postwar elites were given unprecedented power to use discretion to make decisions to solve the goals of society. Inherently this involves trying to deliver ends for the public with means the public themselves wouldn’t have chosen. That’s why we have elites.
But once given this power they decided in many cases to do things to deliver ends against public wishes: high inflation, unprecedented immigration, radical justice reform, modernist architecture, noncontributory welfare.
The elites will have genuinely thought that these things were for the good. But it was a kind of corruption. Not selfish financial extraction, but ideological extraction. They were extractive elites.
Because we haven’t developed a vocabulary for this extraction, and haven’t been able to see it as corruption, the effects — which would otherwise have been predictable — have surprised us, even as we have gone through the same cycle again, during the last 20-25 years.
The coalition of no succeeds when voters correctly identify that their agents, elites, are not acting in their interests. We make negative compromises. Public programs will divert money to DEI so we would rather not have them at all and save on taxes. Scientists advocate for one political coalition — that coalition cuts science funding. In the UK, one side has free rein to insult and one is constrained, so rather than freeing speech, both fight for speech restrictions.
As well as explaining why the coalition of no is succeeding, it explains why genuine corruption is back. For many voters, Trump is less extractive than his opponents.
If you accept my hypothesis, then the path forward is clear. Both sides need to hand in their swords and make positive compromises. For example, traffic enforcement could be increased while speed limits are raised. But until elites see their job as constraining their own tastes to govern for society as a whole, we will continue to decivilise.