New from @tylerhnorris
Most U.S. transmission providers outside the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) already offer a nominally non-firm option called Energy Resource Interconnection Service (ERIS). In practice, however, some grid operators use study assumptions that can require ERIS projects to fund network upgrades for congestion that could instead be managed through redispatch or curtailment. That weakens the economic distinction between firm and non-firm access.
New research covering more than 4,500 interconnection cost studies and 36,000 interconnection requests found that ERIS has not delivered a durable cost or timing advantage. Its observed cost advantage is largely concentrated among projects that avoid network upgrades altogether. Once physical upgrades are triggered, ERIS and firm Network Resource Interconnection Service projects face statistically comparable costs. The authors caution that the papers remain preprints under journal review.
Senator Martin Heinrich’s Grid Connection and Congestion Management Act would require regional grid operators to create a standardized fast-track service called basic access service for energy-only delivery, or BASED. Participating generators and storage projects could connect without funding upgrades intended solely to guarantee deliverability, provided they accept operating limits, redispatch or curtailment when the system is constrained.
The hypothetical example below illustrates the potential inefficiency: requiring a project to fund a large transmission upgrade may make little sense when the constraint occurs during only a limited number of hours and the value of the curtailed electricity is far below the upgrade cost.
In theory, a genuine non-firm pathway could bring generation and storage online faster and make better use of existing transmission capacity. Persistent congestion, curtailment and nodal price differences could also provide planners with clearer evidence about where additional transmission may create the most value. The key caveat is that developers would assume greater curtailment and revenue risk, so the commercial value of the reform depends heavily on how predictable and financeable those operating limits are.