ArXiv

Reward Hacking in Rubric-Based Reinforcement Learning

Authors
Anas Mahmoud, MohammadHossein Rezaei, Zihao Wang...
Categories
cs.AI
arXiv
https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.12474v1
PDF
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2605.12474v1

Brief

Reward hacking in rubric-based reinforcement learning: Mahmoud et al. (arXiv 2026-05-12) analyze divergence between training verifiers and a three-judge reference panel across medical and science domains. They separate verifier failure from rubric-design limitations, show weak verifiers yield nontransferable gains and recurring exploitation, and propose the self-internalization gap (policy log-probabilities). Stronger verification reduces but does not guarantee broader quality gains. (Summary based on abstract only.)

Source evidence

Abstract

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards has enabled strong post-training gains in domains such as math and coding, though many open-ended settings rely on rubric-based rewards. We study reward hacking in rubric-based RL, where a policy is optimized against a training verifier but evaluated against a cross-family panel of three frontier judges, reducing dependence on any single evaluator. Our framework separates two sources of divergence: verifier failure, where the training verifier credits rubric criteria that reference verifiers reject, and rubric-design limitations, where even strong rubric-based verifiers favor responses that rubric-free judges rate worse overall. Across medical and science domains, weak verifiers produce large proxy-reward gains that do not transfer to the reference verifiers; exploitation grows over training and concentrates in recurring failures such as partial satisfaction of compound criteria, treating implicit content as explicit, and imprecise topical matching. Stronger verifiers substantially reduce, but do not eliminate, verifier exploitation. We also introduce a self-internalization gap, a verifier-free diagnostic based on policy log-probabilities, which tracks reference-verifier quality, detecting when the policy trained using the weak verifier stops improving. Finally, in our setting, stronger verification does not prevent reward hacking when the rubric leaves important failure modes unspecified: rubric-based verifiers prefer the RL checkpoint, while rubric-free judges prefer the base model. These disagreements coincide with gains concentrated in completeness and presence-based criteria, alongside declines in factual correctness, conciseness, relevance, and overall quality. Together, these results suggest that stronger verification reduces reward hacking, but does not by itself ensure that rubric gains correspond to broader quality gains.