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Analysing Africa: A new push for African minerals

2026-02-17 · 15:09 UTC ·The Economist ·7 min read

Brief

America’s renewed interest in African mining is centered on securing copper and cobalt from Congo as Washington tries to loosen China’s grip on critical-mineral supply chains. The newsletter’s reporting from Mining Indaba in Cape Town suggests the Trump administration’s approach is unusually urgent, transactional, and larger in scale than prior Western efforts, even if it remains understaffed and ad hoc. Concrete moves include a 100,000-ton copper export arrangement between Gécamines, Mercuria, and the DFC; artisanal cobalt exports routed through the Lobito Corridor; DFC support for Orion Resource Partners’ consortium, which in February struck a provisional deal for 40% of Glencore’s interests in two Congolese assets; and U.S. backing for Virtus Minerals’ bid for Chemaf. The deeper point is industrial-policy related: African leaders may be able to use this geopolitical competition to push for domestic refining and processing, but only if they can pair negotiating leverage with cheaper electricity, better transport links, and local corporate capability.

Why it matters

The Economist’s Africa newsletter says the Trump administration is making a more aggressive push into African critical minerals, especially in the Democratic Republic of Congo, to reduce Chinese dominance in metals supply chains.

Key details

  • Gécamines chairman Guy-Robert Lukama estimates Chinese entities now hold stakes in 90% of major mining projects in the DRC, but says recent American activity means "the fast track has been triggered."
  • In January, Gécamines agreed to export 100,000 tons of copper to America through a deal with Mercuria and the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), giving American buyers first right of refusal on metal allocations tied to Gécamines’ minority stakes.
  • Gécamines also shipped artisanal cobalt via the U.S.-backed Lobito Corridor in a deal with Trafigura, while the DFC-backed Orion Critical Mineral Consortium announced in February a provisional agreement to buy 40% of Glencore’s interests in two Congolese mining assets.
  • The article argues African governments see U.S. interest as leverage to diversify investors and negotiate more local processing, but warns value addition will require better power and logistics infrastructure, tougher negotiators, and stronger domestic mining firms rather than assuming American involvement will drive development by itself.
Cleaned source text

title: Analysing Africa: A new push for African minerals

author: The Economist

content_type: newsletter

publication: e.economist.com

published: 2026-02-17T09:09:00-06:00

source_url: gmail://19c6c25e616bfff3

word_count: 1638

Also: Don’t welcome Africa’s newest despot

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February 17th 2026 For subscribers

Analysing Africa

The best of _The Economist_ ’s Africa coverage

America wants in on African mining

John McDermott

Chief Africa correspondent

“They are pushing, pushing, pushing…”

On Friday afternoon, over a cup of masala chai at a plush Cape Town hotel, Guy-Robert Lukama shares his perspective on America’s new enthusiasm for critical minerals. The chairman of Gécamines, the state-owned Congolese miner, has seen up close the effects of the Trump administration’s desire to loosen China’s control over metals supply chains.

For most of the past 30 years, he notes, many Western investors have been leaving the Democratic Republic of Congo, where he estimates that Chinese entities have stakes in 90% of major mining projects today. But in the past few months there has been a flurry of American activity. “The fast track has been triggered,” says Mr Lukama.

In January Gécamines announced it would export 100,000 tons of copper to America as part of a deal with Mercuria, a commodities trader, and America’s International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), a federal agency. The venture will give American buyers first right of refusal over the metal allocations Gécamines has through its minority stakes in various mines.

Earlier this month, in a separate deal with Trafigura, another trader, Gécamines sent cobalt mined by “artisanal” producers via the Lobito Corridor, a railway project partly funded by America.

The American government is also indirectly bidding for stakes in Congolese mines, via the DFC’s investment in the Orion Critical Mineral Consortium, a fund run by Orion Resource Partners, perhaps the largest private-capital investor in mining. In February the consortium, which is also backed by Abu Dhabi’s sovereign-wealth fund, announced a provisional agreement to buy 40% of Glencore’s interests in two Congolese mining assets.

The American government is also backing a bid by a little-known firm, Virtus Minerals, run by businessmen with former careers in the American military, for Chemaf, a struggling copper/cobalt asset that has been up for sale since 2023.

I have been thinking about these American moves because last week I was part of the jamboree that is Mining Indaba, Africa’s largest mining conference (and, as the scantily clad pamphleteers outside of the conference venue reliably told me, the most lucrative time of the year for burlesque vendors.) I have come away with two conclusions.

The first is that the Trump administration’s approach to critical minerals is of a different magnitude to what the West has tried before. It is understaffed, ad hoc and vulnerable to lobbying by charlatans. But it is still a genuinely urgent effort. “A new aggressive, imaginative, transactional administration does change the landscape,” Brian Menell, the boss of TechMet, a miner that also receives DFC funding, told me.

The second is that African governments see this as an opportunity. For some politicians, such as Félix Tshisekedi, Congo’s embattled president, America’s interest offers protection. For mining executives like Mr Lukama, it is a chance to diversify his investors, find new markets and develop a trading arm. For many others in African governments, American interest is a chance to negotiate deals that involve more processing of metals on the African continent, rather than trucking raw ore from the pit to the nearest port.

That will not happen by default. The Trump administration is not interested in mining in Africa to promote Africa’s economic development. It is up to Africans themselves to ensure this latest enthusiasm for their mineral resources turns out differently to the 2000s, when the commodity boom was not coupled with much value addition. That will require tougher African negotiators, infrastructure (especially power and logistics) that lowers the cost of industrial projects at mines and a focus on building up domestic mining firms.

It is time that Africa did some pushing, too.

In a few weeks’ time we will dedicate an issue to answering questions from you, our amazing readers. What would you like to know? You can ask me, Tom and Ore anything. As long as the question is about Africa, we may even answer it. Write to us at analysingafrica@economist.com.

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Africa this week

A round-up of news from around the continent

▸| The African Union (AU) refused to recognise a parallel government in Sudan led by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary group. The decision, adopted at the continental bloc’s annual summit in Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian capital, is a blow to the RSF’s diplomatic aspirations. Although Sudan’s membership of the AU is currently suspended, the bloc is reportedly preparing to open an office in Khartoum, the capital, which is under the control of the Sudanese Armed Forces, the official army and the RSF’s chief rival. Meanwhile Donald Trump’s chief envoy in Africa, Massad Boulos, signalled that an American-led peace plan brokered between the two sides' main external sponsors—Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates—is close. However, it remains far from clear that either side is ready for peace. On February 10th _Reuters_ reported that the RSF is building a secret military base in neighbouring Ethiopia. Ethiopia’s government responded by cancelling the accreditation of three of the agency’s journalists in the country.

▸| South Africa ’s president said he would deploy troops to two provinces in an effort to combat gang violence. In his annual State Of The Nation Address, Cyril Ramaphosa said soldiers would be dispatched to parts of the Western Cape and Gauteng (the province that contains Johannesburg). In a largely upbeat speech in which he argued that the country’s economy was turning a corner, Mr Ramaphosa noted persistent concerns over the impact of crime. Last year there were about as many murders in the Cape Flats, windswept areas on the outskirts of Cape Town that have their roots in forced displacements under apartheid, as there were in Honduras, a country with a high homicide rate and several times as many people. But whether soldiers are a long-term solution is unclear. Gang violence has deep roots in the Cape. And many South Africans are wary of soldiers after the often brutal methods they deployed during covid-19 lockdowns.

▸| At least 59 people died after a tropical cyclone hit Madagascar and Mozambique. Cyclone Gezani struck Toamasina, Madagascar's main port city, on February 10th, before moving westwards towards Mozambique’s coast. Wind gusts rose to 270 km per hour, ripping off roofs, uprooting trees and destroying power lines. Another cyclone had torn through the same region just ten days before. Madagascar has been hardest hit, with more than 16,000 people displaced this time and an estimated $142m in damages. The country’s military leader, who took power in a coup last year following widespread protests by young Madagascans, is pleading for international help to rebuild the damaged areas.

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